His early work (1921, 1922) said one thing, his later work (c.1931−1950) quite another ("let the dictionary be our guide to reality", according to Hallett 1967: 165; and cf. 158 re semiotics); and it was the later work that centrally inspired the "linguistic turn" of late modern philosophy, the work in which Wittgenstein famously postulated (PI, Par. 43) that "for a large class of cases -though not for all -… the meaning of a word is its use in the language". Subsequent 'analytic philosophy' took up this theme with a vengeance, even to the point of forgetting the qualifi cation "not for all". Subsequent developments in semiotics, however (Todorov 1977; Deely 2006 Deely , 2012a , revealed that the doctrine of signs undermined the very foundations of linguistic philosophy as the Analytic tradition had come to conceive it. Analysis of semiosis shows decisively that "use in a language", considered as a social system of habituated communication, is never the suffi cient condition of meaning distinctive of anthroposemiosis, as it is perhaps in zoösemiosis (and hence within the zoösemiotic component of anthroposemiosis).
Rediscovering a sense for some basic terms
I have made the case many times 1 that the medieval discovery of the sign's triadic character, which Peirce -the fi rst of the postmoderns, by rejecting Descartes' rejection of the past as philosophy's laboratory − famously resumed from the late Latins (Beuchot, Deely 1995) in launching the contemporary development of semiotics (as we have seen it since the 1960s overtake and assimilate to itself the originally dominant approach to signs from Saussure to Barthes called 'semiology'), requires a kind of reversal of the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' as they have come to be established in common usage today through the infl uence of the mainstream modern philosophical development. For this mainstream modern development reduced 'subjectivity' to psychological subjectivity, and 'objectivity' to the supposed state of "things as they are" apart from any 'subjective infl uence' (the a priori forms of Kantian rationality would not count as 'subjective' in the private sense, since they impart to the sensory manifold whatever it comes to have of universal and necessary features).
For semiotics, however, an object is not necessarily opposed to a subject, for nothing prevents what exists subjectively from coming to exist also objectively; and to exist as an object is nothing else than -is synonymous with -existing as something signifi ed, as something terminating a relation founded in (provenating from) some fi nite mind. To be signifi ed and to be an object are exactly the same thing. But this is a feature of reality that remains quite concealed in the common use of the 1 For a full systematic treatment of the subject/object distinction now, see Deely 2009a , but also Deely 2009b , 2010a , 2011 term 'object' , which tends to equate (and hence to confuse) 'objects' with 'things' existing in the world, 2 whether the 'lifeworld' (as modern idealisms understand the term) or the physical world (as modern realisms understand the term).
Let me try at this point to obviate a misunderstanding which a reader of this text might be inclined to fall into. When I say that there are no objects as such outside of apprehensive relations and that all objects as such are signifi cates, I am far from saying that only objects are signifi cates. Th ere is no question of psychologism here, in the pernicious sense which seeks to restrict semiosis to human awareness, or even to the broader biological realm of awareness in animal life. Objects in the full sense make their entry with apprehension, to be sure, but signifi cates are present and at play in nature long before fully actual objects in this strict and narrow sense that I am focusing upon here. Keep in mind that just as objects can also be things, so things can also be signifi cates before the advent of known things ("objects" in the fullest sense). I am grateful to my colleague and friend Vincent Colapietro for calling the pitfall of psychologism to my attention in the text as originally read at a 2006 Bari conference.
of awareness (and aff ection) is always other than the subjective being of the knower, an object is far from always identical with something existing in the physical surroundings independently of the knowing.
The characteristic of objects to be communicable
Oft en the objects of which we are aware have no existence at all apart from the knowing itself, as when we say, falsely, that Hamlet can be well described as happygo-lucky; and oft en, even when the object to which we turn our consideration had an existence apart from the knowing, it does so no longer, as when we say controversially that had Napoleon married the Polish Countess Marie Walewska instead of the Austrian Habsburg Archduchess Marie Louise there would have been no Waterloo. Th e characteristic of objects is not that they always exist in the physical environment but that they are always as objects public in principle, even when they exist for the awareness of but a single individual. Objects can be shared, as any two things can be related to a common third. Th us, when two people "understand one another", the objective content of their understanding is a "common third"; and when one person seeks to acquaint another with some idea in mind, the deed is accomplished, if at all, not by some neural transplant of some feature of the subjective constitution of the fi rst person into the other. (Such a transplant would leave the fi rst quite blank on the matter at issue anyway!). Th e deed is accomplished, rather, by the object of the fi rst's consideration being brought into the cognizance of the consideration of the second. For this, linguistic usage is oft en useful and sometimes essential, but never constitutive.
To be communicated, as we well know, and as any teacher can well attest, the object communicated need by no means have a physical presence to the communicants even when and if it has a physical presence elsewhere, for it need not have or have ever had a physical presence at all in the subjective sense of being an individual physically existing in order to be communicated as an object.
The public character of objects in contrast with the subjectivity of things
So how is it that every object, "real" or "unreal", exists in a public condition in principle (which is the real meaning of 'objectivity' in contrast to 'subjectivity')? For while what is subjectively existing may come also to exist objectively, this is not required (any more -pace Kant -than it is precluded) by subjectivity as such. Th e reason is that an object necessarily, while a subjectively existing thing only contingently, exists as the terminus of cognitive and cathectic relations. Since an object can also exist as more than the terminus of an apprehensive relation, but as such cannot be other than such a terminus, we have the reason why an object is always public in principle, even though the ideas and feelings on the basis of which objects are presented apprehensively are themselves part and parcel of our subjectivity as knowers, as cognitive organisms and animals in the environment.
Signs, strictly and loosely in the common sense
Peirce and Poinsot, in exactly the same way, distinguished 4 between signs in the strict sense, which are triadic relations, and signs in the common or loose sense, which are rather that one of the three elements united in the sign relation which occupies the foreground role of representing what is other than itself to the one for whom the sign is here and now functioning existentially. To the foreground element Peirce gave the technical name 'representamen' , 5 but Poinsot himself gave to it no special name, other than to make it unmistakably clear in the context of his usage that the sign in the loose or common sense is a sign-vehicle rather than a sign strictly, the sign strictly being, for Poinsot as for Peirce (though even more clearly in Poinsot's treatment), as for semiotics today generally, a triadic relation in its suprasubjective character as a relation.
Intersubjectivity as a special case of suprasubjectivity
Notice the diff erence between characterizing a relation as "intersubjective", on the one hand, and as "suprasubjective", on the other hand. 6 Every relation as such exists over and above subjectivity, as what connects or links the individual subject in (or 'on') which the relation is based to what is other than that individual in its private reality. Not every relation is apprehensive (cognitive or aff ective), but every relation which is intersubjective is so by linking two existing individuals or aspects thereof. Th e relation as a relation exists, in such circumstances, not in but between the two subjects. However, when only one of the two related has a physical existence here See Deely 2014, and Chapter 8 in Deely 2010b: "Re-evaluating the relative"; also Deely et al. 2005: 223-242. and now (always true for the knower as knowing, obviously, and the real point of the "cogito ergo sum" formula -though missed by the author of the formula!), if the relation is not apprehensive, then not only cannot it be intersubjectively, but it can be only prospectively. Th e only relations that can actually obtain between an existent subject and a nonexistent object are cognitive and cathectic (or aff ective) relations, as we have noted. But when a relation obtains between a knower and an object that is either physically absent here and now, or simply nonexistent anywhere in the physical environment, while the object cognized or cathected exists indeed as terminating suprasubjectively the apprehensive relation of the knower, that object has at the moment no further being, no subjectivity beyond its objectivity, no 'subjective surplus' to its being as object -at least, not any accessible to the one apprehending.
How a philosophical doctrine of relation unlocks the puzzle
Th e key to understanding this situation proper to objects lies in seeing precisely the connection with being a fundament or being a terminus, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the being of the relation itself which is thus founded and thus terminating. Imagine fi rst a triangle, A, let us call it, existing physically all alone. Now imagine that alongside it though some distance away another triangle B comes into physical existence. A and B at that moment become similar on the basis of their shape, whether or not anyone apprehends them.
Ockham and the mainstream moderns (Bertrand Russell, to his credit, was an exception in that lineage 7 ) would say that this relation of similarity comes into existence only when some knower compares the two. 8 Relations, on this view, have no awareness-independent status: all relations, regardless of circumstances, are awareness-dependent. 7 However, in appreciating the uniqueness of relations as a mode of being, Russell, so to say, over-appreciated it, and sometimes treated relations as things in the fundamental sense of individuals, thus glossing over the dependency in being of relation on a subjective characteristic of an individual for fundament, even as that characteristic in turn depends on the individual to the subjectivity of which it contributes: cf. the "diff erent but related senses" of the term 'thing' enumerated by Owens (1992: 74, 78) as (1) Aristotle, Aquinas, Poinsot, and Peirce would say that the similarity is intersubjectively there in the environment, over and above the things which are similar, even though dependent upon those things in their subjective features as part of their distinct individuality, their subjectivity. Poinsot in particular would further clarify that, while any given relation can be awareness-independent only when it obtains between two physically existent subjects, that same relation can continue to exist awareness-dependently when one or both of the existent subjects has ceased to exist! Th is indiff erence of the positive being of relation as suprasubjective in every case to being or not being intersubjective as well, thus, is precisely what makes the action of signs possible in the fi rst place, because it is what makes relations singularly transcendent to the distinction between what exists independently of and what exists dependently upon the awareness of some fi nite mind.
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Th us, even when intersubjective, relations as such are even more basically suprasubjective, because intersubjectivity is, as it were, but a subdetermination or "modalization" of suprasubjectivity which occurs sometimes, while suprasubjectivity is coterminus always with relation, whether the relation be awareness-dependent or awareness-independent -that is, purely objective or not necessarily objective at all. Whence even a relation which was one time real as obtaining in the physical environment (like that between mother and son both alive, but which now continues only in memory, as the son was by an accident removed from the environment) was at fi rst intersubjective only (at the earliest stage of pregnancy) then became objective as well (once the pregnancy became known, and aft er birth), but is now (upon the child's death) only objective. Yet in all these sets of circumstances the relation is suprasubjective, irreducible to the subjectivity of the mother grieving her son, her son still an object of awareness though no longer a subject of interaction.
On such a view as this last, substantial to semiotics, as it has turned out (signs having been found to consist strictly speaking in relations as such, albeit triadic in character and not merely dyadic as relations can obtain in awareness-independent being), a relation of similarity in the case of simultaneous existents (simultaneous relata, as we might say) related by similarity (or whatever characteristic!) is an intersubjective reality. Th e intersubjectivity in question obtains in the physical world as able to be apprehended but not necessarily actually apprehended (and never apprehended as such by perception, but only in the understanding, 10 which is the ). When the similarity is apprehended, the relation exists objectively as well as in the physical order; but in the given case, even when it is not apprehended, the relation exists as part of the physical reality of the universe -as Emily, the daughter from the famous aff air between the Finnish theologian and the New York lawyer's wife (of which aff air both Emily and the lawyer were ignorant, even as the Finnish theologian was ignorant of the existence of Emily, product of a drunken one-night stand of whose female participant the theologian never even learned the name), is objectively the daughter of the New York lawyer but physically and "really" (i.e., in the order of what is the case independently of awareness) the off spring of the Finnish theologian.
The heart of the matter
But here is the key point. Th e shape of A before B began was intrinsic to A as a subjective characteristic, and remained subjectively the same when B came into existence; yet when B came into existence the shape of A, unchanged as subjective, also became the fundament of a relation of similarity to B: being a shape depends only 11 Th at life depends upon semiosis is a generally accepted thesis in semiotics today. Th e animal umwelt in particular is product of the semiosis whereby, depending upon the animal's bodily type, the physical environment becomes partially objectifi ed in awareness and then organized on the basis of the animal's perception into the desirable (+), undesirable (-), and irrelevant (0). Th is partial reorganization within animal awareness of aspects of the physical environment to make for the animal a "meaningful world" of objects is the process on the side of Innenwelt called by Poinsot 'phantasiari' , in contrast with the process of 'sentire' or basic animal awareness of the surroundings that arises directly from the interaction of the animal's body with the surrounding bodies of the physical environment. Th us sentire provides the animal with the awareness of what it needs to organize according to fulfi llment of its specifi c needs for survival, while phantasiari provides the interpretation of that basic awareness which organizes the umwelt. In the case of human animals a further cognitive level intervenes, 'intelligere' , wherein relations in their diff erence from related objects and things can be directly objectifi ed; and it is this ability to consider objects that cannot be directly instantiated within the umwelt, the world of objects directly perceptible to sense, that Sebeok (1986) came to characterize in a 1984 lecture as "language in the root sense", language as constitutive of the primary modelling system giving rise to linguistic communication as the secondary modelling system enabling the development of culture as the tertiary -not secondary -modelling system. For an overview of Sebeok's argument on this point see Deely 2012b . Th e upshot is that while all animals are semiosic as dependent upon the action of signs, only human animals are semiotic as able to become aware of that action in its formal constitution through relations irreducibly triadic, yet alike with even dyadic relations in being uninstantiable to sentire and phantasiari in their contrast with intelligere. Among the alloanimals, thus, human animals diff er in kind. upon subjectivity, but being a fundament presupposes a relation. And when B came into being, its subjective shape also became the terminus of a relation based on the shape of A as founding (as fundament for) the relation of similarity, which relation itself is to be found neither in A nor in B, but between A and B, i.e., over and above, suprasubjective respecting, both A and B; and conversely, when B came to be, its subjective shape also founded a relation of similarity terminating at the shape of A. Notice therefore: the being of a fundament as such and the being of a terminus as such, even though they both consist in the case before us in a subjective aspect of A and of B, owe their being as fundament and as terminus not to the subjectivity of A and B but to the suprasubjectivity, the actuality as such (also intersubjective in this case), of the relation itself.
Consequences for the doctrine of signs
Th e consequence for semiotics of the fundament and terminus both as such deriving something of their formal status from the relation itself, and only indirectly from any subjective dimension of being fundament or terminus may have in their own right, is profound. Medieval semiotics -the original fl orescence of semiotic consciousness, launched by Augustine's novel proposal of sign in general and culminating in Poinsot's demonstration that the formal being of every sign is an irreducibly triadic relation as suprasubjective − made its fi rst advance by recognizing that not the subjectivity of a material structure made it be a sign (or 'representamen'), but only the relation that material being exhibited to something other than itself in someone's awareness. Whence it could be seen that psychological realities, ideas and feelings, similarly performed the essential sign-function of making present in awareness something that, as other-representations, they themselves were not, namely, their objects.
In recognizing that ideas and feelings -psychological states, cognitive (ideas) and cathectic (feelings) -could not exist save by giving rise to relations to objects, the moderns aft er Brentano saw in this the characteristic they called 'intentionality' , a characteristic which Brentano's student, Edmund Husserl, made the basis for a new variant of mainstream modern philosophy, namely, phenomenology.
12 Th is development was idealistic as Husserl himself came to conceive it, 13 but in itself the recognition of the intentionality (the "of " or "aboutness" of psychological states) is a realization both neutral and incompetent respecting the resolution of the root of the modern controversy between idealism and realism in philosophy. 14 12 Brentano 1874; Husserl 1900 Husserl -1901 Deely 1978. 13 See esp. Husserl 1931; Spiegelberg 1965; Deely 1978 Deely , 2001 14 See Deely 2007. But the Latins in the line from Aquinas to Poinsot aft er Augustine had something the moderns characteristically lacked (by reason of the moderns' following rather, in this particular, the views of William of Ockham, as Weinberg demonstrated), namely, an understanding of the uniqueness of relation among the Aristotelian categories of mind-independent being stemming from the irreducibly suprasubjective character of relation. So the Latins were able to discern in the phenomenon of intentionality something much more profound, to wit, the identity of the objective as such with the terminus of a relation as such, and hence the public character of every object in principle whether that object also existed or not in the physical surroundings. Hence Poinsot in particular, addressing thematically the issue of sign-relations, found himself in a position to see as true for all relations, but decisive particularly for relations of semiosis, the fact that suprasubjectivity in every case, but intersubjectivity only in some cases, distinguishes the being of relations;
15 and that objectivity as such -existing as signifi ed, let us say: existing in the being of a signifi cate as such, that linguistic label which the modern dictionary makers reveal their modern philosophical heritage by resisting -depends in every case upon the unique being of relation among the other Aristotelian categories of the ways in which being can exist independently of human opinion, belief, and desire, each of which categories, with the sole exception of relation itself, 16 either consists in subjectivity (the case of substance, quantity, quality, action, and passion) or presupposes relation (the case of where, when, posture, and vestition or 'habitus'). 
Objects are signifi cates
Th e word 'signifi cate' may be resisted by makers of modern English dictionaries, but it is inevitable once the doctrine of signs reaches a more public maturity. For signifi cate is the proper name for what heretofore confusedly has been generally called 'object' . Psychological states diff er from physiological and inorganic physical states in that the latter two only contingently, but the former necessarily, give rise to relations as suprasubjective structures of being. While a quantity or physical quality can give rise to a relation under one set of circumstances and lose that relation under another set, a psychological state cannot be without giving rise to a relation. Th us a psychological state -cognitive or cathectic -never occurs merely subjectively, but always also fundamentally (as a foundation or fundament) respecting an actual relation. And just as this relation itself is what imparts to the subjective idea or feeling its character as fundament, so necessarily does this same relation impart the status of terminus to something objectively other than the subjectivity of the knower, whether that objectivity has also a subjectivity of its own or not (i.e., whether the relation is intersubjective as well as suprasubjective or only suprasubjective). Th is last is the case of pure objectivity, of a signifi cate which has no being outside the sign relation for which it provides the objective term, contrasting with its representamen and its interpretant alike (as the other two terms essential) in formation of the semiotic triad in which signifi cation as a full actuality always consists in unifying via relation.
Passions of the soul as grounds of objectivity
Just as it is not the eyes that see but the animal who sees by means of the eyes, so it is not a mental representation which perceives or understands but the animal who perceives or (if it be a semiotic animal) understands. Now what are these mental representations by means of which the animal apprehends objects? In contrast to the objects which, as objects, are self-representations, the subjective but psychological states are other-representations. Th ey are, according to late Latin tradition, formal signs, but this designation remained ambiguous as between Ockham, say, and Poinsot, and has not fared well since -largely because representations as "formal signs" belong to that large class of signs loosely so called or "representamens", rather than to the class of signs strictly speaking, that is to say, triadic relations enabling all apprehension of objects, whether partly "real" or purely objective.
In this case older turns out to be better, and although the introduction of the distinction between instrumental and formal signs (around the 14th or 15th centuries), as between sign vehicles which are material substances and sign vehicles which are rather psychological states, did serve to advance the development of the original semiotic consciousness, the original designation of these representative states subjective to the knower as passiones animae, "passions of the soul", may serve us better than the later signa formalia designation. Indeed, this earlier designation goes back among the Latins to at least AD 511-13 (Boethius), and, unlike the notion signum or "sign in general", which eff ectively originated with Augustine AD 397, 18 truly traces back to Aristotle (c. 330 BC) , and the later substitution or imposition upon this notion of the designation "signa formalia" was in essence but the attempt to bring this notion of the "passions of the soul" under the umbrella of the doctrine of signs.
Modern philosophy cut all this off . Not only, beginning especially (but not exclusively) with Descartes did modern philosophy turn from the Way of Signs to the 18 A surprising fact, and one of the most interesting though but recently recognized facts of philosophy's ancient and medieval history. For the Greek period of philosophy before Augustine, see esp. Manetti 1987 Manetti , 1993 Manetti , 2013 Eco et al.1984 and . On the development aft er Augustine up to the 17th century, see Deely 2009c. Way of Ideas, but it did so without the principal modern founders even realizing that the Way of Signs had been opened up. Such ignorance was not the case with the notion or doctrine of the passions of the soul. Yet this notion as intrinsically oriented to the Way of Signs, this notion as it had come to be interpreted among the late Latins, was simply "passed over without comment" by Descartes, through his ignorance of its implications as developed in the 15th-16th century discussion of signa formalia. Familiar at least with the earlier medieval notion of passiones animarum, as also, presumably, of its Aristotelian origins, Descartes said in Article 1 of Th e Passions of the Soul:
…what the Ancients have taught concerning the passions of the soul, is so little, and for the most part so little credible that I cannot hope to draw nigh truth, but by keeping aloof off from those roads which they followed. Wherefore I shall here be forced to write in such a sort, as if I treated of a matter never before handled.
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And he proceeded to handle the passions of the soul in his thoroughly subjectivistic way whereby the mind was cut off within itself from its surrounding environment, as has been eff ectively summarized in the metaphor of the "problema pontis", or "problem of fi nding a bridge" between the external world of things and the internal world of mental representations, "ideas" construed as self-representations.
Passions of the soul as inseparable from relations
Now in this regard the ancient discussion of relative being turns out to be crucial. Everyone agreed that there are in the world individuals, subjects of existence, and that these individuals perforce have distinguishing characteristics or "accidents", as Aristotle termed them. But Aristotle, Aquinas, and Poinsot, in an unbroken tradition picked up again by Charles Sanders Peirce, considered that subjects of existence with their subjective characteristics were not the whole of reality, ens reale (awareness-independent being, the being of the physical universe as such): for in that very awareness-independent order there also obtained, as we saw above -resultant from but not reducible to the subjectivities interacting -relations as such not subjective (though dependent upon the subjective) but intersubjective. Aquinas suggested this point, for example, in his Summa theologiae (1266[1980] : 1.28c), but Poinsot fi rst thematically seized upon the point that intersubjectivity was not the whole story of purely relative being, but only the beginning of the story in ens reale. For once animals had entered upon the scene of the physical environment, with them came relations that were awareness-dependent alongside the awareness-independent relations belonging to the "category" of relation in Aristotle's sense of category: a classifi cation of a way that being can exist independently of thought, action, or belief.
Objects for animals
Animals, in order to orientate themselves in their environment, have to add to the physically related things of the environment relations which specifi cally further relate those things to themselves as objects, for example, in order to track prey, avoid becoming prey, or even simply to "fi nd their way home". Animals do not simply live in a physical environment, they live in an objective world of interpreted things -an umwelt, as Jakob von Uexküll called it for animals in general; a 'lifeworld' , as Husserl would come to say for the case of humans. Th us Jakob von Uexküll (1864 Uexküll ( -1944 was the fi rst thinker thematically to analyse this situation of the diff erence between the physical environment in itself and that part of the same environment as "lived in" and assign a name to the latter. And 'umwelt' was the name he gave to that objective world of the animal as it includes something of, yet diff ers from, the mere physical surroundings.
In Poinsot's tradition, the only thinker to pick up on this fundamental concept, traces of which infl uenced Heidegger as well, was Josef Pieper (1952; see Deely 2004) . But the semiotic roots, so to speak, of the "objective world", the umwelt, are fi rst traced in the remarkable "First Preamble. Article 3" of John Poinsot's Tractatus de Signis of 1632 (esp. 66/47-68/34; see Poinsot 1985) , where he demonstrates that purely objective relations, known in his time as entia rationis, despite their misleading name as "belonging to reason", are formed unwittingly but essentially and necessarily by 'alloanimals' 20 ('brute animals' , in medieval designation for animals able to perceive but not to grasp relations in their diff erence from related things, and hence not able to use linguistic communication as such in the species-specifi cally human sense) no less than by so-called 'rational animals' , or what we have come to call 'semiotic animals ' , namely, ourselves. 20 ' Alloanimals' is a term called to my attention by Myrdene Anderson as used in the work of Count 1973 (and others) to mean all the animals besides the human animals. Th is of course is exactly the sense of the Latin 'brute animals' (animalia bruta), but jettisons the unhelpful pejorative connotations that attach to the adjective 'brute' in modern linguistic usage.
Th is demonstration proves a fundamental breakthrough for our understanding of signs, and for our understanding of the extent of semiosis.
21 It provides nothing less than the fi rst theoretical outlining of what we have come today to call, adopting the apt designation provided by the tireless work in this area of our late friend Th omas Sebeok, "zoösemiotics" (e.g. Sebeok 1963 ). For objects exist fully and formally as such only as terminating suprasubjective relations of apprehension, as we have seen; whence the presence of such relations in the life of all animals already guarantees Todorov's point that "[as] long as one questions oneself only on verbal language, one remains within a science (or a philosophy) of language" (Todorov 1977: 40) ; but once one begins to entertain the notion of semiotics as the doctrine of signs, among the fi rst questions to be faced is "the place of linguistic signs among signs in general" (Todorov 1977: 40) . For once words have been conceived at the level of signs "they occupy only one place among others", whence the independent status of "linguistic analysis", be it scientifi cally or philosophically conceived, is ir- 
Why objects need not be real to be known
Now awareness-dependent (or purely objective) relations are no more subjective than are awareness-independent or so-called (by contrast) "real" ("mind-independent") relations. Moreover, the entire being of all relations, of any relation, is to relate an existing subject to something other than itself, something which it itself is not: some other thing, in the case of categorial or real relations in the order of physical being; some other object in the case of apprehensive relations, and -here again is the key, of which Poinsot was the fi rst thematically to take notice -nothing in the suprasubjective being of relation itself determines whether it will be intersubjective or not,
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Here I am concerned only with the fi rst step in which semiotics went beyond the semiology from Saussure to Barthes: the demonstration of a semiosis beyond linguistically based anthroposemiosis in the broader biological world of animals other than human. Th e further steps semiotics made, rapidly aft er 1963, in demonstrating also a semiosis among plants (phytosemiosis), leading to the umbrella conception of biosemiosis extending to plants and animals along with humans, and then (I fi rst introduced the concept and term 'physiosemiosis' in my talk "Th e Grand Vision", presented at the Charles Sanders Peirce Sesquicentennial International Congress held at Harvard University 5-10 September 1989; see Deely 1994: 183-200 for the published version) to the controversial argument that even in organic nature prior to and independent of life the action of signs was at work, I am far from denying but simply not treating directly in the present essay. but only the circumstances under which the relation is formed here and now. Th us, I can say "It is raining now", and my hearers (if they be English speakers) will have brought before their minds exactly the same objective reality when it is actually raining and when it is not actually raining. In the former case, the relation will be real as well as objective, like the relation between Emily and the Finnish theologian from our point of view (in contrast with the point of view of the New York lawyer, and in contrast with the point of view of the Finnish theologian himself -as we alone know the full story!); while in the latter case, the relation will be no less objective yet it will not be real. Th e relation is unchanged. Th e terminus of the relation, the objective reality, is unchanged. Only the subjective surrounding circumstances are changed, and yet these are enough to make the relation in one case "real" (awareness-independent), in the other case "unreal" (purely objective), and the terminus of the relation in one case more than a terminus merely (a subjective dimension having been added to its objectivity), while in the other case merely a terminus (which is all that objectivity as such, and in order to be public in principle, requires).
How ideas and feelings diff er from objects
Ideas and feelings are not awareness-dependent beings in the Aristotelian categorial sense, even though they require minds in order to be, for it is not the awareness of them that makes them be, but rather their being that shapes and forms awareness. As such, they are qualities in the Aristotelian categorial scheme, and so subjective. But what distinguishes them as subjective is that they are never merely and wholly that, but also always fundaments supporting relations, even when the circumstances required for these relations to be intersubjective are not fulfi lled. Whence, since, as we have seen, it is the actuality of the relation itself which makes a given subjective quality to be a fundament and that maintains a terminus opposed to (correlative with but "other than") the fundament, the objects of such relations constitute a suprasubjective world not only to the extent that their termini incorporate something of the physical surroundings (which they always do insofar as sensation prescissively considered is involved) but equally to the extent that their objective content is not verifi ed or perhaps even verifi able as such in the physical universe as "real", i.e., subjectively existing, whether prior or subsequent to and independent of awareness.
Again, this fundamental insight found nascent expression in the Latin line which culminated in Poinsot's Tractatus de Signis as the fi rst systematic demonstration of the being of all signs as unifi ed in the reality of irreducibly triadic relations. Poinsot (1632 Poinsot ( [1985 : Book II, Question 5, 270/37-271/9) brings to our attention this distinction between objects and things semiotically understood when he incorporates Cajetan's insight (1507) into the doctrine of signs itself:
... the conclusion hangs from that distinguished doctrine in Cajetan's Commentary on the Summa theologiae, I, q. 1, art. 3, that the diff erences of things as things are quite other than the diff erences of things as objects and in the being of an object; and things that diff er in kind or more than in kind in the one line, can diff er in the other line not at all or not in the same way. And so, seeing that the rationale of a sign pertains to the rationale of the knowable [the line of thing as object], because it substitutes for the object, it will well be the case that in the rationale of object an awareness-independent natural sign and a stipulated awareness-dependent sign are univocal signs [are signs in a shared sense]; just as an awareness-independent being and an awarenessdependent being assume one rationale in their being as object, since indeed they terminate the same [cognitive] power ... and can be attained by the same habit .... Th erefore in the being of an object specifying, stipulated and natural signs coincide univocally.
We see then that the "passions of the soul", what we would call today "psychological states", have a decisive role in semiosis. Th ey are within us the subjective ground of our objective world, even as our physical surroundings are the subjective ground of intersubjective relations some of which are objectively incorporated into our objective world as sign relations, the sign relations upon which science and philosophy depend in their diff erence from fi ction. Yet fi ction, too, depends upon these sign relations in order to achieve its credibility, as Umberto Eco (1976: 7) summarized in his famous maxim: semiotics studies "everything which can be used in order to lie".
But these "passions of the soul", subjectively present as part of that which separates and constitutes us each as distinct individuals, unlike the shape of our nose or the colour of our skin, do not provenate 22 or give rise to relations only contingently 22 Th is term from the Latin Age has not yet made its way into English dictionaries. Th e English verb-form 'provenate' is a neologism introduced into semiotics from the 1632 [1985] Latin Treatise on Signs of John Poinsot. Th is verb as an English form derives from the Latin infi nitive 'provenire' , to come or issue forth, appear, arise, be produced; its closest relative in modern English is the noun-form 'provenance' ("where something originated or was nurtured in its early existence"). Hence, a relation provenates from its fundament only contingently in ens reale (i.e., in the order of being as existing independently of awareness) restrictively conceived, but necessarily when the fundament is a psychological state (cognitive or cathectic) of an animal. Th us, as psychological states cannot be without being 'of ' or 'about' something other than themselves, so as qualities they belong to subjectivity indeed, but specifi cally as that subjectivity is entangled inescapably with suprasubjectivity; and the relations consequent upon such qualities do not depend upon a subjectively existing terminus in order to arise as relations. In this case, the relation provenates -i.e., issues forth from or 'on the foundation of ' the psychological quality -necessarily, regardless of any subjectivity on the side of its terminus. For just as terminus as terminus and fundament as fundament equally depend upon the suprasubjective being of relation alike when the terminus also has a subjective dimension and when it does not have such a dimension, so when a quality which (besides being subjectively or dyadically, but necessarily and triadically. Whence these relations also unite or connect us to one another, and in general to everything that we are not in apprehension -not only to other persons and physical realities, but to purely objective and "ideal" realities as well, some of which, no doubt, in the course of time, will become "real" in their own turn, while others will never and some could never exist beyond objectivity.
In conclusion
Th ings exist in themselves. But objects, even when they are also things, and whether or not they are also things, only exist as signifi eds, the signifi cates of semiosis. Th e term 'object' has been around for centuries. Indeed, in the Latin Age, though the thing/object distinction was never fully thematized, it was well on its way to a full thematization, as we fi nd most notably in the opening pages of Poinsot's 1632 Treatise on Signs 23 where he distinguishes objects as self-representations from inherent) is a fundament necessarily and not just contingently gives rise to an actual relation, that relation in turn, while making the fundament a fundament (as formally distinct even though materially identical with the subjective state as inherent accident founding the relation), cannot be except as also making a terminus, even though that terminus is only contingently and not necessarily or even not at all further given subjectively as an instantiation in its own right of the subjective dimension of ens reale. Relations which arise contingently, the only kind considered in Aristotle's circumscription of relation as an irreducible categorial mode of το ὀν, in other words, do necessarily have a terminus which is also a subjective accident; but the necessity in the case directly bears only on the question of the relation's intersubjectivity, not on its presupposed and more basic suprasubjectivity, without which latter "feature" it could not be a relation at all, but with which it may, or may not, depending solely upon circumstances, be intersubjective as well as suprasubjective. Th is is the "singularity" of relation which makes semiosis, the action of signs, possible in the fi rst place, because it is the ground of the prior possibility of the modality of being which has semiosis as its consequent, and which also provides (in anthroposemiosis) the ground of the prior possibility of that conformity between 'thought' and 'thing' in which truth consists (not to mention the alternative generic possibility of deception and specifi cally anthroposemiosic possibility of a lie). Th us the term 'provenate' has been introduced as an English verb precisely in order to clarify the theoretical ground upon which signs depend as a distinct subject of inquiry among the phenomena of nature and culture. Cf. But the modern national languages, as far as concerns philosophy, developed their "common usage" not along the Latin line but rather along the line entailed by Descartes' "turn to the subject", collapsing objects into ideas as subjective psychological states, and combining this move 24 with Ockham's view that relations have no formal reality save within awareness, completing the break of modern thinkers with Latin Scholasticism precipitated most notably by the condemnation of Galileo.
Th us, while the object/thing distinction developed in the protosemiotic period between Augustine ( †430AD) and Poinsot ( †1644) in the line of explaining how things in themselves are knowable though far from the whole of objectivity, modern thought up to Charles Peirce ( †1914) placed the two terms in an opposition defi ned as the two opposing sides of the "problema pontis" with no way across.
Semiotics aft er Peirce turns out to have moved swift ly in the direction of restoring the earlier development, most notably in compelling a realization that the modern usage of the term 'object' has from the fi rst obscured the essential dependency of objectivity upon semiosis. Once we have come to realize, however, that to say 'object' is to say obscurely what 'object signifi ed' says plainly, and further that the 'signifi ed' in the expression 'object signifi ed' is actually redundant (since there is no other kind of object, at least not fully actualized as object, not "as such"), we see that even the term 'object' itself, though unlikely to go away or soon fi nd itself in desuetude, is yet somewhat otiose.
For 'object' mainly says obscurely (and in ways that, over the modern centuries at least, have all but universally led to confusions all around concerning questions of noetic) what the term 'signifi cate' -a term deemed "obsolete and rare" by the OED, beginning, indeed, around the time that modernity in philosophy turned its back on the Way of Signs to explore instead that cul-de-sac termed by Leibniz "the Way of Ideas", the modern way in philosophy -says clearly and with far less likelihood of confusion. At least, this is how it seems to me now that semiotics as the doctrine of signs is coming into its own. Th is systematic contrast between representation generically and signifi cation as species thereof (between the manifestative and the signifi cative aspects of a sign) runs throughout Poinsot's Treatise, and is perhaps most fully explained at 122/17-123/25 and 132/16-46. 24 A move in which, in both respects, John Locke diff ered not a whit from Descartes, the two together laying the groundwork for Kant's "critical synthesis" of modern philosophy as having rendered the world of things-in-themselves unknowable: see the summation in Deely 2013. It is an example of Hoff meyer's (2008: 939) "vis a prospecto", semiosis as an "infl uence of the future" -in this case an "infl uence of the future" bound to eff ect a change of usage, if Ramírez' projection of 2010 proves true:
Most readers of Deely's Four Ages volume encounter diffi culty with his use of the terms "subject" and "object", which are the key to the book. ... Th e shift s in signifi cation Deely's work eff ects [...] awaken us to the fact that [...] every object -given Poinsot's demonstrations regarding the data of external sense, where human awareness (like that of any animal) begins -is something signifi ed [...] that is to say, something depending for its existence, not as a thing (when it is also a thing, indeed), but as an object specifi cally and precisely upon the action of signs. [...] [I] suggest that Deely's new technical usage may actually become a postmodern common usage. (Ramirez 2010: 47, 79) For when the universities fi nally succeed to fi gure out the place semiotics by right occupies within intellectual culture -to wit, as the only inherently transdisciplinary perspective 25 -this "change in common usage" projected by Ramirez seems to me inevitable. Objectivity is simply reality -synechistically conceived in Peirce's sense, 26 i.e., the whole of reality, not just the physical dimension or parts -in relation to fi nite mind.
